Im­pact Se­ries: 05-23

Optimal Carbon Tax for Maritime Shipping?
Environmental Policy meets Network Economics

Outline

The world trading system is a very complicated network comprised of shipping routes that link many connecting ports or nodes. In such a networked setting, the economics of regulation is challenging because the efficiency of a networked system depends on both the set of active nodes (ports) and the volume of activity flowing through its links (trade). In this Kühne Impact Series, I discuss how a standard environmental policy such as taxing carbon emissions may have the unintended consequence of lowering overall network efficiency. As a result environmental policies need to be designed carefully whenever network interaction effects are large. When they are large and positive, as seems to be the case, then the optimal carbon tax is below the marginal social cost of carbon.

Full Article

Introduction

In­ter­na­tion­al ship­ping con­nects over 200 coun­tries, via thou­sands of ports, to con­vey per­haps 80% of world trade (by vol­ume). It is crit­i­cal for the func­tion­ing of the glob­al econ­o­my and of­fers a path to de­vel­op­ment for many dis­tant and com­mod­i­ty-rich de­vel­op­ing coun­tries. Al­though some­what pol­lut­ing, mar­itime ship­ping gen­er­ates the low­est car­bon emis­sions per ton/km of all avail­able trans­port modes.

It is also true that the struc­ture of world trade rep­re­sents a net­work con­nect­ing nodes (ports/coun­tries) via links (ship­ping routes/trade), and there­fore, shocks to one part of the net­work can, and some­times do, dra­mat­i­cal­ly re­ver­ber­ate else­where in the world econ­o­my. There are many re­cent ex­am­ples of these long-armed net­work ef­fects: the dis­rup­tion cre­at­ed by the con­tain­er ship Ever Giv­en be­ing stuck in the Suez Canal; the large sup­ply chain dis­rup­tions cre­at­ed by the Covid pan­dem­ic; and clos­er to home for most peo­ple – the lo­cal air­line de­lays cre­at­ed by vi­o­lent storms in far­away re­gions or coun­tries. Econ­o­mists have been aware of net­work ef­fects for decades, but the for­mal analy­sis of net­work eco­nom­ics in trans­porta­tion be­gan only in the 1990s when U.S. dereg­u­la­tion of pas­sen­ger air trav­el led to con­cerns over flight avail­abil­i­ty and an­titrust is­sues. Net­work eco­nom­ics is now a thriv­ing, very large, and very com­pli­cat­ed branch of ap­plied mi­cro­eco­nom­ics.1

The world trad­ing sys­tem is sure­ly one of the most im­por­tant net­works in the world. Its ge­o­graph­ic scale is un­par­al­leled, and in vol­ume terms alone, it trans­port­ed over 25 tril­lion U.S. dol­lars of ex­ports in 2022. Nat­u­ral­ly, it is dif­fi­cult to ap­pre­ci­ate the com­plex­i­ty of the count­less con­nec­tions this im­plies, but we can at least vi­su­al­ize them. In Fig­ure 1 I present a net­work graph where light grey lines con­nect every pair of coun­tries that trades with each oth­er. These lines rep­re­sent the net­work’s links. Coun­tries, which are the net­work’s nodes, most­ly ap­pear as dots, but rel­a­tive­ly large ex­porters are shown as bub­bles (con­tain­ing their 3-let­ter coun­try code). The size of these bub­bles is pro­por­tion­al to the dol­lar val­ue of their ex­ports. As a re­sult, Chi­na – the world’s largest ex­porter – has the largest bub­ble, and is fol­lowed by the U.S., Ger­many, Japan, etc. The col­or of the bub­bles is also in­for­ma­tive. Dark­er shades of blue mean the coun­try ex­ports to more des­ti­na­tions than coun­tries with a lighter shade. So for ex­am­ple, the U.S. ex­ports to more coun­tries world­wide than any oth­er. The star pat­tern means noth­ing at all; it was se­lect­ed for es­thet­ic and not eco­nom­ic rea­sons.

The world trading system is a connected network: Any disruption or expansion of trade in one part of this network will ripple through the entire system.

Fi­nal­ly, al­though it is vir­tu­al­ly im­pos­si­ble to see – no coun­try is iso­lat­ed. Even the pari­ahs of the world econ­o­my trade with some­one, who trades with some­one else, who trades with ... This tells us that the world trad­ing sys­tem is a con­nect­ed net­work. As a re­sult, the fig­ure is es­pe­cial­ly use­ful in con­vey­ing an idea that sta­tis­tics alone can­not: any dis­rup­tion or ex­pan­sion of trade in one part of this net­work will rip­ple through the en­tire sys­tem. I call these knock-on ef­fects cre­at­ed by shocks, net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects.

But why do these net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects ex­ist, and what does their ex­is­tence have to do with en­vi­ron­men­tal pol­i­cy?

Defining a Network

While it is easy to see how ports and ship­ping con­nec­tions across coun­tries rep­re­sent a net­work of sorts, to an econ­o­mist, a net­work means much more than just con­nec­tions across eco­nom­ic agents. Our en­tire econ­o­my is to some ex­tent a net­work in this sense. More for­mal­ly, we typ­i­cal­ly iden­ti­fy a net­worked set­ting as one with three key fea­tures.

First, there is a group of agents (in­di­vid­u­als, ship­pers, etc.) which we think of as be­ing lo­cat­ed at points or nodes, and this group in­ter­acts in some way along links cre­at­ed amongst them. These could be phys­i­cal link­ages like ship­ping routes be­tween ports; they could be ephemer­al links cre­at­ed via the web or on­line plat­forms; or they could be fi­nan­cial flows across a fi­nan­cial sys­tem; but all net­works must have nodes and links. We tend to think of nodes as de­ci­sion points, and links as rep­re­sent­ing the flow of out­comes from these de­ci­sions.

Own work

Sec­ond, the ben­e­fits of be­ing part of a net­work are in­creas­ing in the num­ber of par­tic­i­pants. So if B(N) is the ben­e­fit (mon­e­tary, psy­cho­log­i­cal, or so­cial) a mem­ber re­ceives by be­ing in a net­work when it has N mem­bers, then we would say B(N + 1) ≥ B(N) ≥ B(N − 1). Big­ger is bet­ter. Be­ing part of any so­cial me­dia plat­form has this fea­ture: it is eas­i­er to learn about new mu­sic or be en­ter­tained by fun­nier cat videos if your so­cial net­work has 1 bil­lion rather than 1 mil­lion peo­ple in it. In the trade con­text, we think of ports and their ship­ping routes as the glob­al trade net­work; and the ben­e­fits of this net­work to par­tic­i­pants should be ris­ing in the num­ber of par­tic­i­pants. For sim­plic­i­ty, I call this the mem­ber­ship ben­e­fit of net­works.

The third, and re­lat­ed fea­ture, is that the ben­e­fits of be­ing a mem­ber in a net­work, of any size, are typ­i­cal­ly ris­ing in users’ ac­tiv­i­ty. Again, in the so­cial me­dia con­text, it is bet­ter if users are ac­tive in post­ing and re­spond­ing to ma­te­ri­als than if they are rel­a­tive­ly silent. And in the trade con­text, adding a po­ten­tial­ly busy port to the world­wide trad­ing net­work is more im­por­tant than adding a qui­et one. We could call this the ac­tiv­i­ty ef­fect, and ex­pand our no­ta­tion to in­clude these new ben­e­fits of net­work ac­tiv­i­ty X so that for any net­work of giv­en size N, the ben­e­fits of be­ing a mem­ber of this net­work are high­er when agents are more ac­tive X. For­mal­ly, we would have B(X′′,N) ≥ B(X′,N) ≥ B(X,N) when­ev­er X′′ ≥ X′ ≥ X. For sim­plic­i­ty, I call this the ac­tiv­i­ty ben­e­fit of net­works.

It is im­por­tant to rec­og­nize why the eco­nom­ic struc­ture of net­works, can and of­ten does, present unique chal­lenges for reg­u­la­tors – be they an­titrust reg­u­la­tors want­i­ng to en­sure com­pe­ti­tion amongst air­lines or en­vi­ron­men­tal reg­u­la­tors want­i­ng to con­strain car­bon emis­sions. The rea­son is sim­ply that when an in­dus­try ex­hibits these prop­er­ties, in­di­vid­ual agents work­ing with­in the net­work make de­ci­sions that are, to some ex­tent, less than so­cial­ly op­ti­mal. The rea­sons for this are sim­ple. When I de­cide to join a net­work, I do so be­cause my per­son­al ben­e­fits of join­ing ex­ceed my per­son­al costs. I do not take into ac­count the ex­ter­nal ben­e­fits I am cre­at­ing for oth­ers via the mem­ber­ship ef­fect. This ben­e­fit is com­plete­ly left out of my cal­cu­la­tion, and there­fore, mem­ber­ship is, in gen­er­al, too low.

Sim­i­lar­ly, when I post an ad­ver­tise­ment for an item to sell on a so­cial-me­dia-spon­sored mar­ket (for ex­am­ple Face­book Mar­ket­place), I do so be­cause it is ex­pe­di­ent for me to do so. When mak­ing my de­ci­sion I don’t take into ac­count that oth­er po­ten­tial sell­ers, see­ing how pop­u­lar this mar­ket­place has be­come, also choose to place their ads in the same place. Greater ac­tiv­i­ty means it’s now eas­i­er for buy­ers and sell­ers to meet – trans­ac­tion costs are low­er and the mar­ket­place is more pro­duc­tive – but I sure­ly didn’t take this into ac­count when I de­cid­ed to post my ad. As a con­se­quence, de­spite how pop­u­lar so­cial me­dia mar­ket­places can be, there may in fact be too lit­tle ac­tiv­i­ty on these net­works.

To understand why network interaction effects should matter to policymakers, we need to take a step back to understand the basic economics guiding environmental policies.

There­fore, al­most by their very de­sign, net­works cre­ate both mem­ber­ship and ac­tiv­i­ty ben­e­fits for par­ties ex­ter­nal to in­di­vid­ual de­ci­sion-mak­ers. In eco­nom­ics, we would say they cre­ate pos­i­tive ex­ter­nal­i­ties. And in an eco­nom­ic sys­tem where par­tic­i­pants are linked and their de­ci­sions cre­ate pos­i­tive ex­ter­nal­i­ties, dis­rup­tions or shocks to one part of the sys­tem will cre­ate knock-on ef­fects else­where; that is, they cre­ate what I re­ferred to ear­li­er as net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects.

To un­der­stand why net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects should mat­ter to pol­i­cy­mak­ers, we need to take a step back to un­der­stand the ba­sic eco­nom­ics guid­ing en­vi­ron­men­tal poli­cies. We start with a sit­u­a­tion where there are no net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects and then ask how their ad­di­tion would mat­ter for the de­sign of en­vi­ron­men­tal pol­i­cy.

Economics 101: A Market Equilibrium

The sim­plest way to con­vey how net­work economies can mat­ter to en­vi­ron­men­tal pol­i­cy is to dis­cuss a sim­ple text­book ex­am­ple (read­ers with an aver­sion to graph­i­cal analy­sis can skip di­rect­ly to the bold­ed sum­maries in this and the next sec­tion). To help with this dis­cus­sion I con­struct the de­mand and sup­ply ap­pa­ra­tus econ­o­mists use to dis­cuss mar­ket out­comes in Fig­ure 2. As shown, it con­tains an up­ward­ly slop­ing sup­ply curve la­beled S, and a down­ward­ly slop­ing de­mand curve la­beled D. Each of these curves rep­re­sents a list or menu of choic­es: quote me a price and I will tell you the quan­ti­ty I want to de­mand (con­sumers) or am will­ing to sup­ply (firms). Their in­ter­sec­tion at point E is where the quan­ti­ty de­mand­ed by con­sumers ex­act­ly match­es the quan­ti­ty sup­plied by firms, at the quot­ed mar­ket price, p*. Since the quan­ti­ty de­mand­ed at that price equals the quan­ti­ty sup­plied, we call this the equi­lib­ri­um price. Also shown is the equi­lib­ri­um quan­ti­ty q*, and I have la­beled two points on the ver­ti­cal axis M and K. Ig­nore for the mo­ment the shad­ed ar­eas.

The price p* brings de­mand and sup­ply into bal­ance. At any high­er price the quan­ti­ty de­mand­ed by con­sumers is small­er; but at this high­er price the quan­ti­ty sup­plied by pro­duc­ers is big­ger. Too much sup­ply and too lit­tle de­mand would lead to prices falling which would in turn reestab­lish the price p where they are once again in bal­ance. This is of course why we call it the equi­lib­ri­um price.

Own work

Apart from iden­ti­fy­ing the equi­lib­ri­um price and quan­ti­ty in a giv­en mar­ket, econ­o­mists also use this di­a­gram to talk about the ben­e­fits pro­vid­ed by free com­pet­i­tive mar­kets like this one. We as­so­ciate the ver­ti­cal height of the de­mand curve, at any giv­en quan­ti­ty, with the max­i­mum will­ing­ness of con­sumers to pay for that quan­ti­ty of the good. It is easy to see that will­ing­ness to pay is great­est when the quan­ti­ty of the good be­ing of­fered is small (near the ver­ti­cal axis), and if we push this quan­ti­ty even small­er to point K, we find con­sumers’ high­est will­ing­ness to pay.

An im­me­di­ate, but not nec­es­sar­i­ly ob­vi­ous, im­pli­ca­tion of this analy­sis is that in the Mar­ket Equi­lib­ri­um, con­sumers are get­ting a great deal. They are pay­ing p for every unit of the good con­sumed, de­spite the fact that their max­i­mum will­ing­ness to pay is in gen­er­al far high­er than p*. We de­fine this gap be­tween what con­sumers would be will­ing to pay, the ver­ti­cal height of the de­mand curve, and what they have to pay in the mar­ket, which is p*, Con­sumer’s Sur­plus. We mea­sure its mag­ni­tude in any mar­ket by an area like the tri­an­gle shown with ver­tices K, E, and p*. In to­tal, it rep­re­sents the ben­e­fits con­sumers reap from the ex­is­tence of this mar­ket.

Now turn to the firms sup­ply­ing this good. The sup­ply curve rep­re­sents, at each quan­ti­ty, the min­i­mum price firms would need to sup­ply that quan­ti­ty of goods to the mar­ket. The sup­ply curve is up­ward-slop­ing be­cause bring­ing more and more of a good onto a mar­ket will be in­creas­ing­ly cost­ly to firms. More work­ers will be need­ed, over­time hours may be re­quired for pro­duc­tion, and firms may need to hold more in­ven­to­ry. For all of these rea­sons, these mar­gin­al pro­duc­tion and de­liv­ery costs rise with the quan­ti­ty sup­plied, and there­fore, firms need high­er prices to com­pen­sate.

Now con­sid­er the ben­e­fits firms get from par­tic­i­pat­ing in this mar­ket. The sup­ply curve mea­sures the min­i­mum price need­ed to con­vince firms to sup­ply a giv­en quan­ti­ty of the good. For very small quan­ti­ties sup­plied, firms are ready to ac­cept rel­a­tive­ly low prices. The low­est price con­sis­tent with some sup­ply is at the hy­po­thet­i­cal min­i­mum point M. As quan­ti­ties grow, the sup­ply curve ris­es re­flect­ing an in­creas­ing mar­gin­al cost of sup­ply­ing ad­di­tion­al units. But at the equi­lib­ri­um price p*, firms are sup­ply­ing the vast ma­jor­i­ty of their out­put at a price well over the min­i­mum they might ac­cept. This gap be­tween the equi­lib­ri­um price p and the min­i­mum ac­cept­able price is called Pro­duc­er Sur­plus. It is giv­en by the yel­low shad­ed tri­an­gu­lar area de­fined by the ver­tices M, E, and p*.

I would like to make two fi­nal ob­ser­va­tions on the Mar­ket Equi­lib­ri­um mod­el be­fore we dis­cuss en­vi­ron­men­tal pol­i­cy. First, it is use­ful to note that no oth­er price, oth­er than the equi­lib­ri­um price p*, would max­i­mize the sum of Con­sumers’ and Pro­duc­ers’ Sur­plus. At any high­er price the mar­gin­al cost of pro­duc­ing goods (the height of the sup­ply curve at the greater quan­ti­ty) is greater than the mar­gin­al ben­e­fit (the height of the de­mand curve at the greater quan­ti­ty). This means that even a well-mean­ing gov­ern­ment could not im­prove on this mar­ket out­come. The mar­ket got it right. It al­ready pro­vides the great­est ben­e­fits it can to so­ci­ety be­cause, sur­pris­ing­ly, the de­ci­sions made by self-in­ter­est­ed con­sumers and pro­duc­ers have un­wit­ting­ly gen­er­at­ed this out­come. As a con­se­quence, the sup­ply curve which re­flects the mar­gin­al cost of pro­duc­tion to pri­vate firms also rep­re­sents the mar­gin­al so­cial cost of pro­duc­tion (MSC); and the de­mand curve which re­flects the mar­gin­al will­ing­ness to pay for pri­vate con­sump­tion – also rep­re­sents the mar­gin­al so­cial ben­e­fit (MSB) of con­sump­tion. This last point – that the mar­ket got it right – was, of course, made much more elo­quent­ly by Adam Smith over two cen­turies ago, and has been the philo­soph­i­cal foun­da­tion for a be­lief in the wel­fare-max­i­miz­ing pow­ers of free and com­pet­i­tive mar­kets ever since.

Our fi­nal ob­ser­va­tion comes in the form of a ques­tion – where does all that Pro­duc­er Sur­plus go? The as­tute read­er will no­tice that to­tal rev­enues to firms are giv­en by the rec­tan­gle (not drawn) de­fined by p* times q*, and the area of this rec­tan­gle is larg­er than the sum of the mar­gin­al costs firms in­cur when pro­duc­ing q* (this is mea­sured by the area un­der the sup­ply curve up to q*) which is their to­tal (vari­able) costs. So is this dif­fer­ence firm prof­its? The an­swer is that in a com­pet­i­tive mar­ket, Pro­duc­er Sur­plus rep­re­sents the re­turn that firm own­ers re­ceive on their past in­vest­ments in plant and equip­ment. If Pro­duc­er Sur­plus was larg­er, their re­turn on cap­i­tal would be greater; if it was small­er, their re­turn on cap­i­tal would be small­er. Im­plic­it­ly, the fig­ure as­sumes firm own­ers are hap­py with the cur­rent state of af­fairs be­cause the com­pet­i­tive rate of re­turn they are earn­ing is as good as they are go­ing to get else­where. If not, they would have left the in­dus­try al­ready.

A competitive market is in equilibrium when the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied.

Summarizing

A com­pet­i­tive mar­ket is in equi­lib­ri­um when the quan­ti­ty de­mand­ed equals the quan­ti­ty sup­plied. Com­pet­i­tive mar­kets max­i­mize the sum of Con­sumer and Pro­duc­er Sur­plus by en­sur­ing that the so­cial costs and so­cial ben­e­fits of the last unit pro­duced are equat­ed. This equi­lib­ri­um could con­tin­ue in­def­i­nite­ly be­cause firm own­ers are earn­ing a com­pet­i­tive rate of re­turn on their in­vest­ments in plant and equip­ment.

Environmental Policy 101: A Regulated Equilibrium

To dis­cuss the im­pact of en­vi­ron­men­tal pol­i­cy we need a rea­son for pol­i­cy, so let’s as­sume each unit of the good a firm pro­duces also emits one unit of pol­lu­tion. To be cur­rent, let our pol­lu­tant be car­bon. And note that, at least in the short run, firms have very few ways to abate car­bon. It typ­i­cal­ly takes time and new in­vest­ment to move away from car­bon-in­ten­sive en­er­gy by al­ter­ing fuel choic­es, tech­nolo­gies in place, etc. So, I as­sume that for our pur­pos­es, the only way to abate car­bon is to pro­duce less out­put. Fi­nal­ly, what is the cost of these emis­sions to so­ci­ety? Since car­bon is emit­ted world­wide and by many in­dus­tries, it is rea­son­able to think the mar­gin­al cost to so­ci­ety for the emis­sions pro­duced in our one in­dus­try is ef­fec­tive­ly a con­stant. I will re­fer to this con­stant per unit cost of car­bon as C, and in the par­lance of en­vi­ron­men­tal eco­nom­ics, C is the mar­gin­al so­cial cost of car­bon. The ex­is­tence of this cost means there is now a gap be­tween the pri­vate and so­cial costs of pro­duc­tion. This is the rai­son d’ être of en­vi­ron­men­tal pol­i­cy.

With these pre­lim­i­nar­ies out of the way, con­sid­er the fig­ure be­low, where I have con­struct­ed a Reg­u­lat­ed Equi­lib­ri­um. In many ways, the Reg­u­lat­ed Equi­lib­ri­um repli­cates the Mar­ket Equi­lib­ri­um just dis­cussed. Equi­lib­ri­um is reached when the quan­ti­ty sup­plied equals that de­mand­ed, and we can again mea­sure Con­sumer and Pro­duc­er Sur­plus sim­i­lar­ly. But the fig­ure be­low is, of course, com­pli­cat­ed by not one but two sup­ply curves, two shad­ed ar­eas, and three dif­fer­ent prices that are la­beled. Ig­nore all of these ad­di­tions and start by notic­ing that our Mar­ket Equi­lib­ri­um sup­ply and de­mand curves, S and D, are just re­peat­ed in the fig­ure. Their in­ter­sec­tion would again gen­er­ate a Mar­ket Equi­lib­ri­um with the price of p and quan­ti­ty q*. So far, so good.

But now, shift your fo­cus to the curve la­beled MSC and re­call that the height of firms’ sup­ply curve rep­re­sents their mar­gin­al cost of pro­duc­tion. If we add to the firms’ pri­vate costs of pro­duc­tion the so­cial cost of the car­bon also emit­ted by pro­duc­tion, then we ob­tain what is known as the mar­gin­al so­cial cost of pro­duc­tion as shown by MSC. By con­struc­tion, this curve only dif­fers from the orig­i­nal sup­ply curve by adding the so­cial cost of car­bon C.

Sup­pose there is no en­vi­ron­men­tal pol­i­cy, and firms are free to emit as much car­bon as they like. Then we are back to our Mar­ket Equi­lib­ri­um out­come at E. But no­tice at E the ben­e­fit to so­ci­ety from the last unit sold, which is giv­en by the ver­ti­cal height to the de­mand curve at E, is now well be­low the mar­gin­al so­cial cost of this last unit, which is the ver­ti­cal height to O. This means this last unit of pro­duc­tion cost so­ci­ety more than it was worth to so­ci­ety. In fact, for all units of pro­duc­tion be­yond qR there is a gap be­tween mar­gin­al so­cial costs and ben­e­fits. And be­cause costs ex­ceed ben­e­fits over this range, the blue shad­ed tri­an­gu­lar area with ver­tices O, S, and E has an area equal to so­ci­ety’s loss­es be­cause too much car­bon is emit­ted in the Mar­ket Equi­lib­ri­um.

Own work

The so­lu­tion to this is sim­ple in the­o­ry. One pos­si­bil­i­ty is to in­tro­duce a car­bon tax on emis­sions. If the tax per unit of emis­sions equals C, then the firm’s full costs would be equal to their pro­duc­tion costs plus their costs from pay­ing the emis­sions tax. This means their will­ing­ness to sup­ply out­put to the econ­o­my would then be re­flect­ed in their new sup­ply curve, which is the curve la­beled MSC for mar­gin­al so­cial cost. Equi­lib­ri­um in the Reg­u­lat­ed Mar­ket would oc­cur at S.

Con­sumers would con­sume qR units pay­ing pD for each unit. Firms would also re­ceive pD but they also need to pay their car­bon tax of C on each unit sold. There­fore, the price firms ac­tu­al­ly get for sup­ply­ing qR units is only pDC = pS as shown. No­tice that at the new Reg­u­lat­ed Equi­lib­ri­um, we have suc­cess­ful­ly bal­anced the mar­gin­al so­cial costs of pro­duc­tion to the mar­gin­al so­cial ben­e­fit of the last unit sold. No oth­er pol­i­cy is re­quired. A sim­ple car­bon tax solves the prob­lem and gen­er­ates an ef­fi­cient so­lu­tion.

De­spite this ef­fi­cien­cy, the lev­el of eco­nom­ic ac­tiv­i­ty in this in­dus­try has fall­en. The out­put of firms is small­er with the car­bon tax in place. More­over, the price firms re­ceive (net of the car­bon tax) for each unit of pro­duc­tion is now low­er than pre­vi­ous­ly. To­geth­er, these ad­just­ments mean that Pro­duc­er Sur­plus of firms falls by the yel­low shad­ed area in the fig­ure with ver­tices A, E, pS, and q*. All else equal, this means that the own­ers of plant and equip­ment in the in­dus­try earn a low­er rate of re­turn than they did pre­vi­ous­ly. This re­duc­tion may lead to their exit from the in­dus­try. In fact, one of the most com­mon ar­gu­ments firms make against a sim­ple car­bon tax plan like the one shown is that it will ef­fec­tive­ly dri­ve them out of busi­ness be­cause it low­ers their re­turn on in­vest­ment. Sim­ple eco­nom­ics sup­ports this claim.

The price con­sumers have to pay for the good has also risen with the car­bon tax. As a re­sult, they lose some Con­sumer Sur­plus (not shown), but they also ben­e­fit from the fact that car­bon emis­sions are now low­er (also not shown). But not every­one can lose be­cause so­ci­ety as a whole gains from the im­po­si­tion of the car­bon tax: no­tice that the gov­ern­ment (which is part of so­ci­ety!) col­lects car­bon tax­es equal to the rec­tan­gle with ver­tices pD , S, A, and pS. Whether firm own­ers or con­sumers win from car­bon tax­es de­pends on how gov­ern­ments dis­trib­ute or re­cy­cle this rev­enue. For ex­am­ple, the gov­ern­ment could re­bate it to con­sumers by send­ing them checks in the mail; they could in­stead use the tax rev­enues to pay for oth­er pub­lic goods; they could use the rev­enue to low­er tax­es else­where while keep­ing their bud­gets in bal­ance; or they could in­stead re­bate rev­enues to firms. The pos­si­bil­i­ties are end­less.

Policy makers have to ask whether the imposition of the carbon tax in one market has important knock-on effects in other markets.

While there are a myr­i­ad of op­tions, we now know that how gov­ern­ments re­cy­cle their car­bon tax rev­enues mat­ters not only for the dis­tri­bu­tion of costs and ben­e­fits of the pol­i­cy, but also for the wider econ­o­my’s over­all ef­fi­cien­cy. This is a crit­i­cal point. It fol­lows for an ob­vi­ous rea­son but the com­plete ar­gu­ment is a lit­tle sub­tle. We know that any real-world econ­o­my has many tax­es in place be­cause gov­ern­ments must raise rev­enues for the pro­vi­sion of pub­lic goods like ed­u­ca­tion, trans­porta­tion, health, etc. How­ev­er, some of these tax­es cre­ate large gaps be­tween the costs and ben­e­fits of pri­vate trans­ac­tions. This is in­ef­fi­cient for the econ­o­my as a whole. We might think of low­er­ing these es­pe­cial­ly in­ef­fi­cient tax­es and use our car­bon tax rev­enues to make up the dif­fer­ence. This is called rev­enue re­cy­cling, and if those new car­bon tax rev­enues ex­act­ly off­set the loss­es we in­cur by low­er­ing those oth­er in­ef­fi­cient tax­es, we call it a rev­enue neu­tral car­bon tax plan. Rev­enue re­cy­cling is, not sur­pris­ing­ly, a good thing for the econ­o­my. But there are lim­its to how good. Since car­bon tax­es are pri­mar­i­ly en­er­gy tax­es, they af­fect al­most all sec­tors of an econ­o­my, and pol­i­cy­mak­ers need to wor­ry about how car­bon tax­es in­ter­act with those ex­ist­ing in­ef­fi­cient tax­es (or dis­tor­tions). They have to ask whether the im­po­si­tion of the car­bon tax in one mar­ket has im­por­tant knock-on ef­fects in oth­er mar­kets. By that, we mean, does it make the ex­ist­ing in­ef­fi­cien­cies cre­at­ed by our tax sys­tem even worse?

If so, our cal­cu­la­tion of the costs and ben­e­fits of the sim­ple car­bon tax shown here needs to change. In the eco­nom­ics lit­er­a­ture these knock -on ef­fects are called the tax in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects and they are the added costs or ben­e­fits that arise else­where in the econ­o­my when we im­pose a broad–based car­bon tax. Tax in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects have been stud­ied ex­ten­sive­ly, but in a nut­shell, they are al­most al­ways cost­ly to the econ­o­my and their costs are larg­er than any ben­e­fits we might get from rev­enue re­cy­cling. As a re­sult, the ex­is­tence of tax in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects ar­gues for a low­er tax on car­bon emis­sions than the C we im­posed here. It has to be low­er be­cause of those net neg­a­tive knock-on ef­fects.2

Tax interaction effects are almost always costly to the economy and their costs are larger than any benefits we might get from revenue recycling.

Summarizing

In the Reg­u­lat­ed Mar­ket Equi­lib­ri­um, the quan­ti­ty de­mand­ed equals the quan­ti­ty sup­plied. When the car­bon tax is set equal to the mar­gin­al so­cial cost of car­bon, and there are no tax in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects, this equi­lib­ri­um is ef­fi­cient. The mar­gin­al so­cial cost of the last unit of pro­duc­tion equals its mar­gin­al so­cial ben­e­fit. The car­bon tax in­creas­es over­all wel­fare to our so­ci­ety (CS, PS, and tax rev­enues), but can cre­ate both win­ners and losers. In the ab­sence of tax re­bates or sim­i­lar ad­just­ments, the pro­duc­ers will see a re­duc­tion in Pro­duc­er Sur­plus and a low­er­ing of the rate of re­turn earned on their in­vest­ments in plant and equip­ment. Firms may exit the in­dus­try as a re­sult. When tax in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects are present, they im­ply the ef­fi­cient car­bon tax is be­low the mar­gin­al so­cial cost of car­bon we iden­ti­fied as C.

Implications for Maritime Shipping

Let’s now as­sume that net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects are present in mar­itime ship­ping. These ef­fects could come from ei­ther, or both, of the un­der­ly­ing mem­ber­ship and ac­tiv­i­ty ben­e­fits com­mon to net­work set­tings. Let’s also in­ter­pret the sup­ply and de­mand curves pre­vi­ous­ly shown in terms of ship­ping ser­vices for bulk com­modi­ties.3

Specif­i­cal­ly, let the de­mand curve be the de­mand for ship­ping ser­vices from pro­duc­ers at port A want­i­ng to de­liv­er their goods to port B. Let the sup­ply curve rep­re­sent the in­creas­ing num­ber of bulk ships will­ing to make the voy­age from A to B as the price they re­ceive for the trip ris­es. Be­fore the car­bon tax is im­ple­ment­ed, the num­ber of voy­ages made is q*. Af­ter the car­bon tax is im­ple­ment­ed the vol­ume of ship­ping falls to qR; that is, ship­ping ac­tiv­i­ty to port B falls.

If ports A and B are part of a wider ship­ping net­work that ex­hibits a pos­i­tive ac­tiv­i­ty ex­ter­nal­i­ty, this re­duc­tion will low­er pro­duc­tiv­i­ty else­where in the net­work. For ex­am­ple, with the ac­tiv­i­ty at port B now re­duced be­cause of the car­bon tax, com­mod­i­ty ship­pers at port B may have a very hard time find­ing a bulk ship to car­ry their own car­go on­ward from port B to some oth­er port C. The ben­e­fi­cial trades that would have oc­curred be­tween ship­pers in B and ship own­ers with ships present at port B, will now not oc­cur be­cause few­er trips and ships now land at B. This re­duc­tion in ac­tiv­i­ty has a so­cial cost and con­sti­tutes a net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fect of the car­bon tax.

In ad­di­tion, the ship own­ers that do car­ry goods from A to B, reap a small­er Pro­duc­er Sur­plus from their voy­age than pre­vi­ous­ly. Note their fuel plus tax costs are now high­er with the car­bon tax. This im­plies their re­turn on cap­i­tal is now low­er, and when it is time to scrap their ship and rein­vest, they may not do so. The fleet, what­ev­er size it may have been, is small­er as a con­se­quence. This can mean that small­er, mar­gin­al ports that were prof­itable be­fore the tax was im­ple­ment­ed, are no longer prof­itable now. Ports may close and mem­ber­ship in the net­work falls. These changes can also cre­ate pro­duc­tiv­i­ty loss­es, and there­fore are also part of our net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects.

In sum­ma­ry, the full im­pact of a car­bon tax on the mar­itime ship­ping in­dus­try con­sists of the change in Con­sumer Sur­plus, pro­duc­er sur­plus and tax rev­enues col­lect­ed by gov­ern­ments, but we must also con­sid­er – how the car­bon-tax-cre­at­ed net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects – low­er so­cial wel­fare else­where. A re­duc­tion in net­work size or ac­tiv­i­ty cre­ates neg­a­tive net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects, and this sug­gests our sim­ple car­bon tax at lev­el C is too high.

Do Network Effects exist in Maritime Shipping?

The ar­gu­ment thus far begs an im­por­tant ques­tion: do net­work ex­ter­nal­i­ties ex­ist in glob­al ship­ping, and if so, do they cre­ate net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects? The an­swers we have come from three dif­fer­ent ap­proach­es. One ap­proach re­lies on in­di­rect ev­i­dence of the strength of net­work ef­fects. This ev­i­dence is ob­tained by tak­ing a giv­en net­work and in­ves­ti­gat­ing its sta­tis­ti­cal fea­tures. For ex­am­ple, when net­work ex­ter­nal­i­ties ex­ist they tend to pro­duce out­comes where the ma­jor­i­ty of ac­tiv­i­ty is con­cen­trat­ed in only a few nodes (ports), with many oth­er nodes (ports) far less ac­tive. This bunch­ing or con­cen­tra­tion of ac­tiv­i­ty is a phe­nom­e­na of­ten as­so­ci­at­ed with the name of Ital­ian poly­math Vil­fre­do Pare­to (1848–1923) who just hap­pened to be a Pro­fes­sor of Po­lit­i­cal Econ­o­my at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Lau­sanne. It is Pare­to who is re­spon­si­ble for the Pare­to prin­ci­ple (20% of the Y de­liv­er 80% of the Z). This ob­ser­va­tion was sub­se­quent­ly for­mal­ized in the Pare­to dis­tri­bu­tion, which bears his name and ex­hibits this same fea­ture. Dis­cov­er­ing that a net­work’s ac­tiv­i­ty is dis­trib­uted across its nodes in a Pare­to fash­ion does not prove there are strong net­work ex­ter­nal­i­ties, but the find­ing is con­sis­tent with and sug­ges­tive of them.

To il­lus­trate this Pare­to fea­ture we can use the same world trade data shown in Fig­ure 1 to present a fig­ure that re­lates the num­ber of coun­try-to-coun­try trad­ing links a coun­try has (per­haps its 130) to its place in the world rank­ing of ac­tive nodes (this num­ber of links would put it in the top 5 coun­tries). To turn this in­for­ma­tion into a dis­tri­bu­tion – that we can re­late to Pare­to – we need to use per­cent­ages rather than raw num­bers, and its best to show the out­come in a graph. In Fig­ure 4, we plot the per­cent­age of unique coun­try-to-coun­try links on the ver­ti­cal axis against, the per­cent­age of coun­tries or­dered by rank that have those links. The black dot could be called the Pare­to point. It rep­re­sents the point where coun­tries in the top 20% by rank trade along 80% of the world’s links. It’s im­por­tant to rec­og­nize that our data may or may not fall any­where near the Pare­to point, but by con­struc­tion, the dot­ted line shown must go through both the ori­gin and then rise to point (1.1) at the top right cor­ner. Be­yond this, the shape is en­tire­ly de­ter­mined by the data.

One thing is ob­vi­ous. The set of trad­ing links is high­ly con­cen­trat­ed. The U.S., Chi­na, and the EU would for ex­am­ple cap­ture the lion’s share of all routes/links in the data. In fact, read­ing ver­ti­cal­ly up from the point at .1 on the hor­i­zon­tal axis, we find that coun­tries in the top 10% (by rank) trade along on 51% of all the routes/links (the .51 in the la­bel bub­ble). Read­ing up us­ing the yel­low dot­ted line, we see that the coun­tries in top 20% trade along 74% of all pos­si­ble routes/links (and note how close this re­sult is to the Pare­to Prin­ci­ple re­quire­ment of 80%). Fi­nal­ly if we read up from .4, we find that coun­tries in the top 40% ac­count for 94% of all routes/links. This is over­whelm­ing ev­i­dence that world­wide ship­ping links are high­ly con­cen­trat­ed across coun­tries. This first piece of ev­i­dence is high­ly sug­ges­tive of net­work ef­fects.

A sec­ond, more di­rect method to in­ves­ti­gate net­work ef­fects is to use ship­ping data to eval­u­ate whether the his­toric pat­tern of world­wide mar­itime ship­ping ex­hibits net­work fea­tures. For ex­am­ple, Kosows­ka-Stamirows­ka (2020) uses ma­chine learn­ing al­go­rithms to pre­dict both the flow of trade be­tween port pairs and the like­li­hood of a new trad­ing link be­ing cre­at­ed be­tween ex­ist­ing ports. She finds a very ba­sic fea­ture of net­work ar­chi­tec­ture – the num­ber of com­mon neigh­bors any two ports have – is the strongest pre­dic­tor of trade flows and the like­li­hood of a di­rect trade route ex­ist­ing. This im­plies that shocks to the sys­tem – nat­ur­al oc­cur­ring shocks or pol­i­cy cre­at­ed shocks – that af­fect the num­ber of near­est neigh­bors for any port, will rip­ple through the en­tire struc­ture; that is, they will cre­ate net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects.

Fi­nal­ly, while these two pieces of ev­i­dence are sug­ges­tive of strong net­work ef­fects, they do not es­ti­mate them. To take this last step we need to find an ex­plic­it con­nec­tion be­tween fea­tures of world trade and the strength of net­work ex­ter­nal­i­ties. Re­cent work by Hei­land et al. (2019) does just that by us­ing an ex­plic­it mod­el of trade with­in a spa­tial net­work. They find very sig­nif­i­cant pos­i­tive net­work ex­ter­nal­i­ties with­in the glob­al trad­ing sys­tem. This im­plies, there­fore, that neg­a­tive pol­i­cy shocks will have knock-on ef­fects else­where – net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects are real – and can cre­ate sig­nif­i­cant so­cial costs that are not ac­count­ed for in our stan­dard eco­nom­ic analy­sis.

The next step is to find an explicit connection between features of world trade and the strength of network externalities.

Own work

Conclusion

The in­ter­na­tion­al trad­ing sys­tem re­lies on a healthy and vi­brant mar­itime ship­ping in­dus­try to de­liv­er goods world­wide. For coun­tries far from the rich­est mar­kets and with ex­ports that are of the low­est val­ue to weight, dis­rup­tions to this in­dus­try will be cost­ly. These are pri­mar­i­ly de­vel­op­ing coun­tries who are re­ly­ing on trade as an en­gine of growth and a path to pros­per­i­ty. It is then es­pe­cial­ly im­por­tant we get any en­vi­ron­men­tal pol­i­cy af­fect­ing the mar­itime sec­tor right, be­cause the costs of not do­ing so will fall dis­pro­por­tion­ate­ly on poor na­tions.

In this note, I have sug­gest­ed that the struc­ture of world trade can best be thought of in terms of a net­work where ports serve as nodes and the flow of trad­ed goods car­ried by ves­sels rep­re­sents their links. In net­work set­tings like this one there are of­ten ex­ter­nal ben­e­fits (ex­ter­nal­i­ties) cre­at­ed by ei­ther in­creas­es in ac­tiv­i­ty (the flow of trade) or in­creas­es in their mem­ber­ship (the en­try of new ports). When these net­work ex­ter­nal­i­ties ex­ist, any shock to the sys­tem – whether pos­i­tive or neg­a­tive – flows through the net­work via what I have called net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects. In gen­er­al, both pos­i­tive and neg­a­tive shocks are mag­ni­fied be­cause of the pos­i­tive ex­ter­nal­i­ties in­her­ent in the net­work struc­ture.

The im­me­di­ate and im­por­tant im­pli­ca­tion of this is that our stan­dard text­book so­lu­tion to in­ter­nal­ize the so­cial cost of car­bon emis­sions is un­like­ly to hit the mark. When a car­bon tax low­ers net­work ac­tiv­i­ty and makes ports less prof­itable, it will have knock-on ef­fects with neg­a­tive so­cial costs. All else equal, the op­ti­mal car­bon tax will be low­er than oth­er­wise. This re­sult mim­ics well known re­sults in en­vi­ron­men­tal eco­nom­ics where tax in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects in economies with ex­ist­ing dis­tor­tions low­ers the op­ti­mal car­bon tax be­low the Pigou­vian (C in our con­text) lev­el.4 It is also im­por­tant to rec­og­nize that while I have pre­sent­ed this ar­gu­ment us­ing a car­bon tax, less ef­fi­cient en­vi­ron­men­tal mea­sures – such as tech­no­log­i­cal re­quire­ments or per­for­mance stan­dards – will work slight­ly dif­fer­ent­ly but will also cre­ate net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects. Land-based trans­port and air trans­port may also ex­hib­it these ef­fects.

All of these con­clu­sions fol­low when sig­nif­i­cant and pos­i­tive net­work ex­ter­nal­i­ties char­ac­ter­ize the world trad­ing sys­tem. While the ev­i­dence at this point in time is frag­men­tary, it is also sug­ges­tive. The dis­tri­bu­tion of net­work links is well ap­prox­i­mat­ed by the Pare­to dis­tri­bu­tion tied to net­work de­sign; ex­ist­ing net­work struc­tures pre­dict trade flows and port cre­ation very well, and es­ti­mates of the in­ter­na­tion­al ex­ter­nal­i­ties with­in the world trad­ing net­work are pos­i­tive.

The way for­ward is clear. Re­searchers and pol­i­cy­mak­ers alike need to fo­cus on un­der­stand­ing the eco­nom­ics of en­vi­ron­men­tal pol­i­cy in net­worked set­tings. We should ask how com­mon net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects are in the econ­o­my over­all, and we should be de­vel­op­ing em­pir­i­cal meth­ods to es­ti­mate their size. En­vi­ron­men­tal poli­cies need to be de­signed care­ful­ly when­ev­er net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects are large. When they are large and pos­i­tive, as seems to be the case, then the op­ti­mal car­bon tax is be­low the mar­gin­al so­cial cost of car­bon.

  1. See the re­cent book length treat­ment of Goy­al (2023). Im­por­tant ear­ly work on net­work de­sign in trans­porta­tion is Hen­dricks, Pic­cione and Tan (1995).
  2. The most well-known ex­am­ple of these tax in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects is ex­am­ined is Boven­berg and Goul­der (1996). They show that in the pres­ence of an­oth­er dis­tor­tion in the econ­o­my (a dis­tor­tionary la­bor tax), the op­ti­mal car­bon tax is sig­nif­i­cant­ly low­er than the Pigou­vian lev­el C shown in our fig­ure. Ex­cep­tions to this rule are dis­cussed in Goul­der (1995).
  3. The mar­ket for bulk car­go ship­ments and ves­sel trip sup­ply does not op­er­ate like the smooth­ly op­er­at­ing de­mand sup­ply analy­sis we have con­struct­ed. In­stead ship­pers and ship own­ers search for part­ners and ne­go­ti­ate over prices. A mod­el of bulk ship­ping with ex­plic­it search and ne­go­ti­a­tion is Bran­cac­cio, Kaloupt­si­di and Pa­pa­geor­giou (2020). None of these real-world com­pli­ca­tions al­ters the ba­sic point I will be mak­ing.
  4. The prob­lem I have de­scribed here is well known to econ­o­mists. If there are (un­re­al­ized) net­work economies in world ship­ping AND ship­ping emits car­bon, there are two prob­lems for gov­ern­ment pol­i­cy to ad­dress and not just one. As a re­sult, the ef­fi­cient so­lu­tion al­most al­ways re­quires two poli­cies, and ad­dress­ing only one of the prob­lems while ig­nor­ing the oth­er may even make mat­ters worse by cre­at­ing neg­a­tive net­work in­ter­ac­tion ef­fects. This is per­haps the most im­por­tant im­pli­ca­tion of the sem­i­nal work of Lipsey and Lan­cast­er (1956) on the Gen­er­al The­o­ry of Sec­ond Best. In our sim­ple con­text, one so­lu­tion is to use a car­bon tax to in­ter­nal­ize the so­cial cost of car­bon, but we also need to in­ter­nal­ize the so­cial ben­e­fits of net­work ex­pan­sion by sub­si­diz­ing port con­struc­tion (be­cause of mem­ber­ship ex­ter­nal­i­ties) and fa­cil­i­tate high­er vol­umes of ship­ping (be­cause of ac­tiv­i­ty ex­ter­nal­i­ties). Even if these sub­si­dies ex­ist, we need to co­or­di­nate their lev­el and ad­just their strength with the in­tro­duc­tion of a car­bon tax for the so­lu­tion to be ef­fi­cient. In the ab­sence of co­or­di­na­tion, the sec­ond-best pol­i­cy is to let one of the in­stru­ments (a car­bon tax) de­vi­ate from what it would have been oth­er­wise. In our con­text, it would be low­er.
  • Boven­berg, A Lans, and Lawrence H Goul­der. 1996. “Op­ti­mal en­vi­ron­men­tal tax­a­tion in the pres­ence of oth­er tax­es: gen­er­al-equi­lib­ri­um analy­ses.” The Amer­i­can Eco­nom­ic Re­view, 86(4): 985–1000.
  • Bran­cac­cio, Giu­lia, Myr­to Kaloupt­si­di, and Theodore Pa­pa­geor­giou. 2020. “Ge­og­ra­phy, trans­porta­tion, and en­doge­nous trade costs.” Econo­met­ri­ca, 88(2): 657–691.
  • Goul­der, Lawrence H. 1995. “En­vi­ron­men­tal tax­a­tion and the dou­ble div­i­dend: a read­er’s guide.” In­ter­na­tion­al tax and pub­lic fi­nance, 2: 157–183.
  • Goy­al, San­jeev. 2023. Net­works: An eco­nom­ics ap­proach. MIT Press.
  • Hei­land, Inga, An­dreas Moxnes, Karen He­lene Ulltveit-Moe, and Yuan Zi. 2019. “Trade from space: Ship­ping net­works and the glob­al im­pli­ca­tions of lo­cal shocks.”
  • Hen­dricks, Ken, Michele Pic­cione, and Guo­fu Tan. 1995. “The eco­nom­ics of hubs: The case of mo­nop­oly.” The Re­view of Eco­nom­ic Stud­ies, 62(1): 83–99.
  • Kosows­ka-Stamirows­ka, Zuzan­na. 2020. “Net­work ef­fects gov­ern the evo­lu­tion of mar­itime trade.” Pro­ceed­ings of the Na­tion­al Acad­e­my of Sci­ences, 117(23): 12719–12728.
  • Lipsey, Richard G, and Kelvin Lan­cast­er. 1956. “The gen­er­al the­o­ry of sec­ond best.” The re­view of eco­nom­ic stud­ies, 24(1): 11–32.

About the Series

The Kühne Cen­ter aims to es­tab­lish it­self as a thought leader on is­sues sur­round­ing eco­nom­ic glob­al­iza­tion – by con­duct­ing rel­e­vant re­search and mak­ing its in­sights avail­able to a broad au­di­ence. The Kühne Cen­ter Im­pact Se­ries high­lights re­search-based in­sights that help to eval­u­ate the cur­rent world trad­ing sys­tem and to iden­ti­fy what works and what needs to be im­proved to achieve a tru­ly sus­tain­able glob­al­iza­tion.

Author

M. Scott Taylor

Director of the Kühne Center for Sustainable Trade and Logistics at the University of Zurich

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